January 29, 2012
January 18, 2012
January 16, 2012

Stealth Engagement?

The past few weeks have made me scratch my head about the dramatically dissonant signals coming out of Washington. One possible conclusion is pure chaos and incompetence, with no one in control of the message.
 
But there is an alternative explanation that intrigues me. Perhaps messages are being delivered to multiple audiences more or less simultaneously, in a complicated effort to have your cake and eat it too. Or as I would like to believe, undertaking a new initiative with Iran while trying to disarm the political opposition.
 
In December, the action was entirely with Leon Panetta, the Secretary of Defense and former director of the CIA. On December 2, he gave a devastating appraisal of the negative consequences of a war with Iran. The Washington Post grumbled editorially that he should keep his opinions to himself, since he risked giving aid and comfort to Iran.  
 
Almost as if to apologize for his off-script remark, on Panetta’s next public outing to CBS Evening News on December 19, he speculated that Iran could hypothetically have a nuclear weapon in about a year. Then, on January 8, on “Face the Nation  Panetta declared: “Are they [Iran] trying to develop a nuclear weapon? No.” He quickly added: “our red line to Iran is do not develop a nuclear weapon. That’s a red line for us.” The first comment got remarkably little attention, while the “red line” comment predictably became the headline.
 
Was this amazing zig-zag performance just incompetence (which is not a Panetta trademark)? Or was it evidence of two alternative policies fighting for position in the administration?
 
On January 10, Secretary Clinton condemned Iran’s shift of enrichment activities to the deep underground Fordo facility outside Qom. But she coupled her statement with a strong pitch for a return to negotiations: “We reaffirm that our overall goal remains a comprehensive, negotiated solution that restores confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program while respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy consistent with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” As usual, the condemnation was the lede.
 
At almost exactly the same time, the Obama administration dispatched Deputy Secretary Bill Burns to Istanbul to discuss issues relating to Iran. Although his visit was billed as an effort to persuade Turkey to join in the next round of sanctions against Iran, there was widespread speculation that he was actually laying the groundwork for a new round of negotiation with Iran.
 
On the following day, an Iranian scientist was murdered in Tehran. By accident or design, it seemed timed to interfere with the Istanbul initiative. Secretary Clinton responded personally in the strongest terms, asserting unequivocally that the United States had nothing to do with any “violent acts inside Iran” and condemning such actions.  The U.S. government had made no such intervention in previous assassination cases. If the perpetrator was, as widely suspected, Israel, this was a serious warning not to interfere in U.S. diplomatic efforts. And, of course, it was a reassurance to Iran, whose top negotiator, Ali Larjani, a close adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamene`i, was just arriving in Istanbul.
 
Three days later, Larijani announced that Iran was willing to return to serious negotiations. That suggests that U.S. messages to Iran via the Turks had been fairly constructive and even persuasive.  However, the headline in the New York Times the day before Larijani’s announcement was that the United States had delivered a stern warning to Iran not to close the Strait of Hormuz. This, it was reported, was delivered via a special channel (some might suspect the Turkish intermediaries), yet this careful leak completely washed out any mention of the Turkish initiative.
Since that time, there has been a leak to the effect that Israeli intelligence has been recruiting Iranian dissidents while pretending to be CIA agents, what is known in the trade as a “false flag” operation. Is it entirely by chance that this information, which has been languishing in the files of the CIA since the days of George Bush and which casts doubt on the reliability of Israel as a strategic ally, suddenly appears in the midst of the current crisis? Subsequently, as reported by blogger Jim Lobe, a scheduled exercise between Israeli and U.S. missile forces has been cancelled, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been dispatched to Israel.
 
If nothing else, the past month or so provides an extraordinary example of tergiversations in U.S. policy pronouncements. Why?
 
The Obama administration has three problems with the Iran issue.
 
First, it is an election year, and the Congress is determined to impose total sanctions against Iran’s petroleum sector. In a sense, this is the ultimate stage of the sanctions process. For 16 years, the United States and its allies have piled more and more sanctions on Iran for the avowed purpose of getting Iran to change course on its nuclear program. It didn’t work. When the sanctions started, Iran had zero centrifuges. Sixteen years and many sanctions later, Iran has about 8,000 operational centrifuges and a substantial stock of low enriched uranium.
 
In this process of ever-accelerating sanctions, we have arrived at a point where sanctions begin to blur into actual warfare. If the sanctions succeed in their purpose of cutting off nearly all oil exports from Iran, that is the equivalent of a blockade of Iran’s oil ports, an act of war.
 
It was always said that the failure of sanctions would leave nothing but war as an option. It was not always appreciated that, at a certain level, sanctions and warfare would converge. With the latest sanctions rider on the Defense Authorization Bill, reluctantly signed into law by President Obama, the Congress has maneuvered the executive branch into a tacit declaration of war.
 
Second, it is my judgment that the Obama administration has looked hard at the potential effects of getting dragged into a war with Iran and has decided that a return to the negotiating track is essential.
 
But third, the Netanyahu government distrusts the diplomatic track. Israel signals as strongly as possible that it is prepared to strike unilaterally if necessary; and it uses those threats as leverage to keep the situation at a constant crisis pitch, while pressing for the most extreme sanctions. Israel’s influence is not to be underestimated, particularly in an election year and with an Israeli prime minister who makes no attempt to conceal his disdain for President Obama. (Israel in fact may be more isolated on the Iran war issue than might be evident at first glance. Ron Paul has been outspoken in his opposition to war with Iran, and he has been pulling 20 percent or more of the Republican primary vote.)
 
So what does the U.S. administration do in those circumstances? If this analysis is correct, it opens lines of communication with Iran; it pairs every negotiating move with a tough statement on Iran, keeping the public focus on the unyielding opposition to Iranian nuclear advances and threats; and it tells Israel in no uncertain terms to back off.
 
That kind of three-dimensional chess is not only complicated; it is not normally regarded as a U.S. strong suit. Naturally, you cannot conduct major negotiations with Iran without attracting public attention, whether in the United States, in Israel, in the Arab Middle East states, or elsewhere. But if you throw enough anti-Iran dust in the air, you may defuse any concerted attack – figuratively or otherwise.
 
The new sanctions go into effect in six months, just before the political nominating conventions. President Obama will have to have something positive to show before that time if he is to justify putting the sanctions on hold. This is the diplomatic equivalent of a two-minute drill in football. It is a thing a beauty when it works, but it is not for the faint of heart.

January 14, 2012
January 12, 2012
January 6, 2012

A Satire on the Costs of a War With Iran

A colleague, Orrin Schwab, wrote the following tongue-in-cheek response to the apparent congressional eagerness to start a new war in the Middle East. Good satire often makes a serious point; in this case, it highlights the very real potential costs of a war with Iran. That is something you seldom hear from the war hawks, who want you to believe that it will be quick, bloodless, and cost-free to us.

 *********************

If there is near unanimity in the Congress to go to war with Iran I say lets go. Lets do it!  They are the duly elected representatives of the people of the United States and they have determined that war with Iran is in the best interests of the country.  We should initiate hostilities as soon as practicable.

Here are some parameters to consider for our war:

1. Iran is 1.6 million square kilometers and has approximately 80 million
    inhabitants (77-78 million plus).

2. That makes Iran four times the area of Iraq and three times the
    population of Iraq.

3. The Iraq War was completed very quickly, and very easily. But the
    occupation, i.e. the reduction of resistance lasted ten years and has
    produced a relatively weak state.

4.  In order to do things right this time, we need sufficient ground
    forces to secure a mountainous multiethnic country with more than two
    thousand years of national history. We may be welcomed as liberators
    but coalition forces ultimately met with armed resistance from
    numerous  groups many of whom practiced deadly suicide attacks.

5. We need a long term occupational force for Iran.  I think an effective
    occupation of 80 million people spread over 1.6 million square
    kilometers should require well over 1 million well trained troops for
    at least 5 years maybe 10 years if things go badly.

6. The only way we can provide this level of forces is through a return to
    the Draft. The Selective Service system needs to activated
    immediately.
    All military reserves needed to be recalled to active duty while we
    begin the process of training millions of young male and female
    draftees for service in Iran.  A five year occupation should require,
    ballpark, 5 million draftees.  Of course, we have the manpower.
    According to the CIA, the U.S. has 120 million males and females
    between the ages of 18 and 49 who are fit for military service.

7. The direct financial cost of the war should be a multiple of the Iraq
    War which was 800 billion from 2003 through 2011.  The cost of
    deploying troops to Afghanistan averages about one million dollars per
    troop.  If we plan on 1 million troops for five years that would mean
    5 trillion in direct costs financed by the U.S. Treasury through
    2016-2017 and then undetermined costs thereafter.

8. The economic benefits of this exercise in military Keynesian economics
    should be huge. Unemployment should disappear.  War related
    manufacturing should be a virtual renaissance for domestic industry.
    The financing of the war will significantly increase the public debt, anathema to     Republicans, but they are spoilsports. They reject military Keynesianism, which worked wonders for Japan and Germany in the 1930s and 1940s as well as the United States and the Soviet Union.

9. No whining about casualties. The U.S. could sustain hundreds of
    thousands or more total casualties, including deaths from combat,
    disabling wounds, and huge numbers of psychiatric losses related to
    combat and the effect of concussive injuries to the brain.

Orrin Schwab is an independent scholar living in Las Vegas, Nevada. He has a Ph.D. in U.S. international history from the University of Chicago where he studied under Bruce Cumings and Akira Iriye. 

January 4, 2012

Who’s Afraid of the Ayatollahs?

Politicians and pundits are curiously schizophrenic when discussing Iran. On one hand, they are prepared to declare, as Mitt Romney did, that the “greatest threat that Israel faces, and frankly the greatest threat the world faces, is a nuclear Iran.” To deal with this threat, he says as president he will “restore the regular presence of aircraft carrier groups in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf region simultaneously… .increase military assistance to Israel and coordination with all of our allies in the region.” Further, he is willing to consider “blockade, bombardment, and surgical military strikes.”

At the same time, when Iran actually issues a threat, such as the recent suggestion that it would close the Strait of Hormuz if its oil exports were interrupted, pundits and analysts from all sides rushed to assure Americans that in any showdown, Iran would be no match for the U.S. military. The mismatch in forces is so one-sided, they contended with good reason, that Iran would never dare attempt such a misguided action that would bring them into conflict with the mightiest military in the world.

The implication is that Iran, if it ever acquired a nuclear weapon, would be an intolerable threat to the United States and Israel (which have a combined total of well over 8000 operational nuclear weapons), but in the meantime Iran’s leaders are afraid to confront the United States because they are out-gunned.

Without questioning the logic of this proposition, just how worried should we be about Iran? How much harm can Iran actually do to us?

This question is important since, despite all the scare talk, the United States and its allies are actually conducting their relations with Iran as if they were entirely immune to any retaliation.  Such policies include the use of drones for both reconnaissance and attack; covert (or officially deniable) actions, such as the Stuxnet worm introduced into the Iranian nuclear infrastructure and/or assassinations of suspect individuals; displays of military force; and destructive unilateral sanctions.

War by Stealth

President Obama deserves admiration for the skill with which he has moved the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts off the front pages, at the same time that he was moving soldiers out of the war zones. This, it is worth remembering, was what he was elected to do.

But as he was ending the most visible part of America’s ongoing wars, he was shifting to stealth warfare: drone reconnaissance and attack, assassinations, cyber warfare, and highly specialized small unit operations. It is certainly true that these tactics are less expensive than large scale combat, and they are less likely to produce negative political responses, at least among Obama’s voting constituencies. But they rely on a perception of impunity that is misleading and ultimately dangerous.

Drones are useful to track the activities of relatively primitive opponents, specifically opponents who have no significant air defenses or technological counter-measures. Over the barren skies of Afghanistan, Waziristan and Iraq, they can operate with little fear of interception or interference.

That is not true in a country with more sophisticated defenses. Recently, a stealth drone was downed in Iran. Iran claims that it spoofed the aircraft into believing it was returning to its base, when in fact it was landing in Iran. The Iranian story is credible, though we may never know all the facts. At least two other U.S. drones had previously been downed over Iran, though they were apparently shot down, not commandeered.

Losing a drone, however embarrassing, is not as costly as losing a manned aircraft. That is the appeal. But the fact that we were flying drones over Iran suggests we thought we could do so with impunity. Did we overestimate our own technological prowess? Did we underestimate Iran’s? Either way, it should be a lesson to those who are now assuring us almost daily that a surgical strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities could be conducted with little cost and manageable repercussions.

Little noticed was the Iranian announcement that it had rolled up a CIA espionage ring in Iran. If true, this is the third time since the revolution that a major U.S. spy ring was neutralized.

Cyber Blowback?

The introduction of the Stuxnet worm into Iran’s nuclear enrichment plant at Natanz probably slowed Iran’s production of low enriched uranium for a period of time, but enrichment never really stopped and within several months it had recovered to its previous level. It was a clever ploy, apparently created by one or more national cyber warfare laboratories. Whether true or not, Iran believes it was done by Israel and the United States, and Iran’s interpretation will shape its response.

Whoever planted the Stuxnet worm (and apparently a new version called “Duqu” that has showed up in recent months), probably assumed that its originators were immune from retaliation. Is that really true?

Iran has a very highly developed cyber warfare capability of its own, with a battalion of young, skilled IT engineers. Until now, they have focused primarily on putting down the incipient revolt that followed the contested elections of 2009. In that effort, they were much more efficient than the Egyptians, or Syrians or other Middle East nations who have tried to stop use of the internet for social and political mobilization. But what happens next?

The United States and all other developed industrial states rely on computer-driven systems for their most mundane and most sensitive services, everything from waste disposal sites to dams to nuclear plants. Cyber warfare specialists are openly worried about the vulnerability of these systems to a sophisticated cyber attack. And such attacks, if well planned, leave no discernible fingerprints.

As in the case of the stealth drone, are we as invulnerable as we thought? What if a power plant in your vicinity suddenly and mysteriously exploded or ran amok? You probably would not blame your national security officials, but you might be wrong. In cyber warfare, the playing field is much more level than in conventional warfare.

Are Sanctions the Answer?

More recently, the U.S. Congress has been insisting on sanctions against Iranian banks that, in effect, make it impossible for Iran to sell its oil. That is the equivalent of a military blockade of Iran’s oil ports, arguably an act of war. And these sanctions are being imposed unilaterally, without reference to the United Nations Security Council. Members of Congress can go home to their districts and boast about how tough they can be on Iran, and in an election year that is worth a few votes. President Obama seems unwilling to buck the tide, despite his better judgment.

Iran has responded with harsh words, indicating that if Iran’s oil lifeline is cut off, others will also find their access to world oil markets imperiled. Iran does not need to close the Strait of Hormuz to make a point. Its words make it clear that an act of war by the United States will be treated as such by Iran. Even the threat of a confrontation immediately drove the price of oil above $100 per barrel, which has effects on economies struggling to recover from the recession.

The main reason why Iran’s putative threat to close the Strait of Hormuz was dismissed is because Iran also relies on the Strait to export its own oil. But if Iran’s oil revenue – fifty percent of its budget – is cut off, they would have little to lose by striking out at those they hold responsible, including passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran cannot defeat the U.S. Navy, but the swarms of cruise missiles they could fire both from shore and from their fleet of speedboats could create havoc, as could the flood of mines they could put into the fast-moving waters of the Strait.

If pressed to the wall and facing collapse of its economy, Iran might reasonably try to make life as miserable as possible for those it holds responsible, including the loading facilities and refineries of the U.S. Arab allies across the Gulf from Iran. Iran’s cruise missiles can be used at targets other than ships.

Iran would eventually lose this battle, but the rest of the world would have paid a very high price. A prolonged period of oil prices above $200 and the uncertainty about when normal supplies could be resumed would do real damage to the fragile and recovering economies of Europe and the United States.

I’m sure the members of Congress who are trying to outdo each other in anti-Iran bravado spent little time worrying whether they and their constituents might be harmed in various ways by an Iran that sees itself under attack. Some openly welcome the idea of a third Middle East war, whatever the consequences.

Slouching Toward War

These are the same illusions of righteousness and impunity that preceded the U.S. invasion of Iraq. As General Zinni memorably noted, if you like Iraq and Afghanistan, you’re going to love Iran. Those who suggest that a U.S. military confrontation with Iran would be surgical, limited, and one-sided are many of the same people who eight years ago assured you that the invasion of Iraq would be a cakewalk.

Remember that Iran has been developing a nuclear enrichment capability for more than twenty years – more than thirty if we include our nuclear cooperation with the shah – all the while as members of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. They almost certainly experimented with development of a nuclear weapon during the days of Saddam Hussein, but according to U.S. intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) those experiments stopped with the fall of Saddam in 2003. The latest IAEA report, based on the observations of their own inspectors at key Iranian sites, found no evidence that Iran is diverting nuclear material to build a bomb.

The alarms that some are sounding as they openly try to push the United States into another truly catastrophic war in the Middle East are based on the fact that Iran MIGHT choose at some point in the future to build a bomb. Advocates of war try to transform that into a certainty that Iran WILL build a bomb and then use it, probably against Israel. That fear of a suspected nuclear capability as a rationale for going to war should by now sound familiar to most Americans. It is exactly the same argument that got us into Iraq.

An impeccable array of U.S. and Israeli security officials have spoken openly of the absolute folly of going to war with Iran and have warned against exaggerating either the threat or Iran’s intentions. Those voices include the top military leaders and intelligence officials in both the United States and Israel.

After a decade of war and trillion dollar deficits, the United States should be well aware that such adventures can do us real harm. An important set of experienced voices continue to call for a return to negotiations. Iran says it is willing. We risk greatly and unnecessarily if we ignore the chance.

December 5, 2011
December 4, 2011

Panetta on War With Iran

I recent months, we have had some strong views expressed, by people who have real knowledge of the situation, about the potential consequences of a military strike by Israel and/or the United States against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Former Mossad head Meir Dagan says  it is “The stupidest idea I’ve ever heard.”

On Friday, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, speaking to a strongly pro-Israel audience at the Saban Center in Washington, responded as follows to a question about how long a military attack on Iran would postpone it from getting a bomb:

         SEC. PANETTA:  Part of the problem here is the concern that at best, I think - talking to my friends - the indication is that at best it might postpone it maybe one, possibly two years.  It depends on the ability to truly get the targets that they’re after.  Frankly, some of those targets are very difficult to get at.

            That kind of, that kind of shot would only, I think, ultimately not destroy their ability to produce an atomic weapon, but simply delay it - number one.  Of greater concern to me are the unintended consequences, which would be that ultimately it would have a backlash and the regime that is weak now, a regime that is isolated would suddenly be able to reestablish itself, suddenly be able to get support in the region, and suddenly instead of being isolated would get the greater support in a region that right now views it as a pariah.

            Thirdly, the United States would obviously be blamed and we
could possibly be the target of retaliation from Iran, striking our ships,
striking our military bases.  Fourthly - there are economic consequences to
that attack - severe economic consequences that could impact a very fragile
economy in Europe and a fragile economy here in the United States.
            And lastly I think that the consequence could be that we would
have an escalation that would take place that would not only involve many
lives, but I think could consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a
conflict that we would regret.

            So we have to be careful about the unintended consequences of
that kind of an attack.
 * * * * * *
A responsible leader has to think not only about yielding to impulse, but also about how a decision would look on the morning after. Secretary Panetta could scarcely have been more explicit about the potential folly of a third Middle East war.