Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Everett wrote an important op-ed in the NY Times over the Memorial Day holiday. It wonders whether the Obama administration has not already “lost Iran,” almost before it has begun. [Click on the above title to see the full text.]
The first clue to their very negative interpretation of current U.S. policy toward Iran is their regret that President Obama has refused to pursue “an American-Iranian ‘grand bargain’ — a comprehensive framework for resolving major bilateral differences and fundamentally realigning relations.” Of course this is a disappointment for them since they have been the most prominent, persistent and persuasive advocates of such a “grand bargain.”
Their disappointment is justified. Obama made it clear from the beginning that he was not going to rush into substantive negotiations with Iran at least until the Iranian people had a chance to vote on June 12 in what is perhaps their most important presidential elections in the thirty years since the Islamic revolution. One may argue with that judgment, but I for one think that it was the right approach, since I did not think the Iranians would be in any position to give us a constructive, positive response while the electoral campaign was underway.
There is also a more philosophical concern about a Grand Bargain. One should not confuse a desirable outcome of U.S.-Iran relations with a negotiating strategy. A very successful outcome of negotiations with Iran might indeed incorporate changes in Iran’s nuclear activities, their support for radical organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and cooperation on regional security in Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader Persian Gulf region; in return for changes in U.S. policy on sanctions, detailed assurances about U.S. involvement with dissident groups aiming to overthrow the Iranian government, and practical adjustments in U.S. regional security activities, e.g. basing, deployments, targeting and operations along Iran’s borders that they may see as threatening.
Although some or all of those elements (or others) may be seen as an ideal outcome by many, it is just that – an outcome, not a negotiating strategy. It is where you hope to emerge, not where you go in. If all these issues are linked together at the start in a highly ambitious package, it will almost certainly fail. An overdose of linkage, in which lack of movement on one front can prevent progress on another, is a recipe for stalling and stalemate.
The Leveretts’ disappointment that these elements have not yet been introduced in the first four months of the Obama administration suggests that they believe such a package is the appropriate starting point for a U.S. engagement with Iran. If so, I suspect that represents a distinctly minority view.
Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett also view with alarm the appointment of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and regional adviser Dennis Ross. Clinton has been much more hostile in her comments about Iran than has President Obama, and they quote Ross (quite persuasively) as favoring negotiations only as precursor to more radical pressure on Iran after the negotiations fail.
If, again, we are thinking about how we enter negotiations with Iran, the tough words of Secretary Clinton could be regarded as a positive factor, if only to let Iran know that there is opposition inside the administration to any easy deal and they should not expect a pushover. After all, that is exactly the posture that Iran strikes – letting everyone know that there are radical and conservative factions within Iran who are likely to view any deal with the United States as appeasement. That is a realistic opening tactic in what is likely to be a difficult and prolonged negotiation, and there is no reason we should not play the same game. We need to be ready to walk away from the table to make a point.
The appointment of Ross is a different matter. His last-second, midnight appointment with an exceptionally fuzzy job description suggests that he was not an uncontested candidate. He joined the Obama campaign early, which should not endear him to Clinton. There have been a number of leaks and unsourced press reports claiming that Ross is functioning as the principal manager of the Iran policy review. A lot of those reports read as if they might have originated with Ross himself, who originally proclaimed himself a kind of Iran policy czar and who clearly aspires to that role. However, when the United States met with the other major powers on the subject of Iran in London recently, Washington was represented by Undersecretary of State Bill Burns with NSC adviser Puneet Talwar, and Ross was nowhere in sight…
There is an emerging Washington parlor sport of trying to figure out who is actually driving U.S. policy on Iran. Dennis Ross started about three years ago to refashion himself from a Palestinian-Israeli maven into an Iran expert. Over that period he wrote a number of papers and op-eds, and he participated as a signatory in other studies and web sites – all of which fit the pattern identified by the Leveretts as favoring lip service to negotiations while insuring failure.
Until just before he was nominated for his present position, Dennis Ross was, among other things, the chair of the Israeli-based Jewish People Policy Planning Institute http://www.jpppi.org.il/ which is supported by the Jewish Agency and which produces “professional strategic thinking and planning on short and long-term issues of primary concern to the Jewish People, with special attention to critical choices that have a significant impact on the future.” He was for seven years, quite simply, an informal (but well paid) policy planner for the Israeli government, writing policy papers for the president of Israel, among others. That his policy positions parallel those of the Israeli government should surely come as a surprise to no one. That he favors a pro forma attempt at negotiations with Iran, followed by far more severe sanctions or even military action if and when they fail, should also not be a surprise to anyone who reads the Israeli newspapers.
The real question is whether Dennis Ross is actually in charge of U.S. Iran policy. The Leveretts see his presence as evidence that the Obama administration has succumbed to pressure and has therefore “lost” Iran. They cite Obama’s acceptance of a deadline as ominous evidence that he has caved in to pressure.
But President Obama has been saying something very different. His actual words to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu about prospective Iran negotiations were: “We should have a fairly good sense by the end of the year as to whether they are moving in the right direction and whether the parties involved are making progress and that there’s a good-faith effort to resolve differences. That doesn’t mean every issue would be resolved by that point.” Although he appreciated the danger of indefinite talk with no action, he rejected the idea of an “artificial deadline.” Obama is very careful with his use of words, and it is important to pay attention to what he actually says, rather than the words that advocates on various sides may try to put in his mouth. That was no deadline.
The Leveretts distinguish between Obama’s rhetoric and the actual policy, but in fact the rhetoric IS the policy at this stage, and the rhetoric has been entirely Barack Obama – not Hillary Clinton and certainly not Dennis Ross. The real question is: Who is writing Obama’s material, if it is not the Secretary of State or the erstwhile adviser on Persian Gulf policy? (Some have even been heard to suggest that that sneaky Joe Biden is getting in a few licks.) I admit I don’t know, and I would be delighted to get a little enlightenment.
The Leverett article is a timely cautionary note, which reminds us that we need to watch the new administration with a careful and critical eye. However, before we give up on Obama’s negotiating approach, I suggest that we wait until there are actually some negotiations. Let us not start at the end of the process but rather at the beginning, where we (and the Iranians) still find ourselves.
gary
