Obama’s Oslo Declaration and US Middle East Policy
President Obama’s Nobel acceptance in Oslo directly addressed two fundamental issues dealing with US-Iran policy.
With regard to sanctions and their effectiveness in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, this is what he says:
“… .in dealing with those nations that break rules and laws, I believe that we must develop alternatives to violence that are tough enough to change behaviour – for if we want a lasting peace, then the words of the international community must mean something. Those regimes that break the rules must be held accountable. Sanctions must exact a real price. Intransigence must be met with increased pressure – and such pressure exists only when the world stands together as one… .
“But it is also incumbent upon all of us to insist that nations like Iran and North Korea do not game the system. Those who claim to respect international law cannot avert their eyes when those laws are flouted. Those who care for their own security cannot ignore the danger of an arms race in the Middle East or east Asia. Those who seek peace cannot stand idly by as nations arm themselves for nuclear war.”
In my reading, he says in effect that (1) [crippling?] sanctions are the [only?] way to enforce international law; (2) the correct use of sanctions is to generate pressure [i.e. coercion] to get states “to change behaviour”; and (3) that can only be accomplished “when the world stands together as one,” i.e. when a consensus is achieved among all the major nations. Also, his emphasis on sanctions instead of the use of force suggests that he is not contemplating a military strike against Iran nuclear facilities and, by implication, would not approve an Israeli unilateral strike.
That, as I understand it, is precisely the position that was taken by the “American team” in the Harvard simulation last week [see postings below]. So Obama’s statement lends even greater weight and verisimilitude to the policy choices of that team. However, the American team, despite its most strenuous efforts, was unable to get agreement on a sufficiently powerful set of sanctions to affect Iran’s behavior. On the contrary, in the process of trying, they offended most of their negotiating partners and drove the Russian and Chinese teams to accommodate Iran in a side deal that left the US, not Iran, isolated.
Now, that was only a game, not a predictor of the future. But I believe the course of events in the game was in fact the most probable outcome of such a policy. So, based on a straightforward reading of the president’s text, I would disagree with his prescription.
The second point was human rights. The Obama administration has been criticized by proponents of human rights in Iran for not taking a stronger position in support of the opposition forces there. His Oslo statement should quell some of those criticisms. He said:
“In some countries, the failure to uphold human rights is excused by the false suggestion that these are western principles, foreign to local cultures or stages of a nation’s development. And within America, there has long been a tension between those who describe themselves as realists or idealists – a tension that suggests a stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to impose our values.
“I reject this choice… . even as we respect the unique culture and traditions of different countries, America will always be a voice for those aspirations that are universal. We will bear witness to the quiet dignity of reformers like Aung Sang Suu Kyi; to the bravery of Zimbabweans who cast their ballots in the face of beatings; to the hundreds of thousands who have marched silently through the streets of Iran. It is telling that the leaders of these governments fear the aspirations of their own people more than the power of any other nation. And it is the responsibility of all free people and free nations to make clear to these movements that hope and history are on their side.”
But finally, he added:
“Let me also say this: the promotion of human rights cannot be about exhortation alone. At times, it must be coupled with painstaking diplomacy. I know that engagement with repressive regimes lacks the satisfying purity of indignation. But I also know that sanctions without outreach – and condemnation without discussion – can carry forward a crippling status quo. No repressive regime can move down a new path unless it has the choice of an open door… .”
This seems to mitigate the harshness of the earlier sanctions passage, even though it was raised in a different context. If it is true that leading a repressive regime down a new path requires offering an open door, does that imply that issues of security, as well as human rights, also demand negotiation in addition to coercion alone?
I hope so, because I really think that serious negotiation is a precondition to genuine progress on *both* security and human rights. In his speech, President Obama cites Nixon’s meeting with Mao despite the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. He could as easily have noted that the meeting came despite Mao’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon in contradiction to the wishes of the international community and his expressed willingness to use it to achieve his maximalist political goals, even if it meant millions of deaths. He cited Ronald Reagan’s efforts on arms control and embrace of perestroika as empowering dissidents in Eastern Europe. Was Reagan’s primary objective improved human rights or was it to establish a stable relationship with our greatest nuclear rival?
A straightforward reading of the Oslo speech would suggest that President Obama believes that pressure, coercion and punishment are most appropriate for dealing with security issues, while negotiation is essential for the promotion of human rights — even with the worst regimes in the world. He would seem to deny that sanctions can serve as incentives or trading points, not simply and always as punishment.
I think that is a false reading. In his effort to send a tough message to the world (and to a large proportion of the American electorate), I think he may have rhetorically closed a door that he intended to leave open. If the speech was intended to pressure Iran in the context of serious negotiations, that is one thing. If, however, it was intended as policy prescription — and I very much hope it was not — then the Harvard simulation outcome of US failure and alienation is likely to be our near term future.
